butters
High on a Hill
- Joined
- Jul 2, 2009
- Posts
- 84,890
well, according to the author of this article anyway 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/2...ign=25595&utm_term=Flashpoints OC&?tpcc=25595
the article is long and detailed, covering far more than the euro epidemic response; it covers the extensive aid to the Ukraine (both financially--$20billion--and by helping it integrate into the west via e.u standards) which it recoups to the tune of $16billion annually from the ukrainans working in europe (10% of the country's GDP). it also addresses the strength of europe in the brexit bargainings, its results on controlling immigration, the usa/uk relationship, the inseparable trade&financial links between the usa and europe, and lots more besides. well worth taking the time to read all the way through.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/2...ign=25595&utm_term=Flashpoints OC&?tpcc=25595
the article is long and detailed, covering far more than the euro epidemic response; it covers the extensive aid to the Ukraine (both financially--$20billion--and by helping it integrate into the west via e.u standards) which it recoups to the tune of $16billion annually from the ukrainans working in europe (10% of the country's GDP). it also addresses the strength of europe in the brexit bargainings, its results on controlling immigration, the usa/uk relationship, the inseparable trade&financial links between the usa and europe, and lots more besides. well worth taking the time to read all the way through.
Several months ago, when COVID-19 struck Europe, headlines portrayed overflowing hospitals in Italy, policy mistakes in Britain and Sweden, mismanaged senior care in Belgium, and misbehaving youth in Spanish discos. Two months later—after European governments imposed lockdowns, mask-wearing, testing, and tracing—the incidence of new cases plummeted. By July, vacationing Europeans were strolling through Piazza Navona in Rome, attending the opera in Salzburg, and dining in Paris.
Americans are not welcome to cross the Atlantic, however, because the United States has failed to match Europe’s resilience. Instead, new cases trended upward through the summer, leaving the average American 10 times more likely to contract the coronavirus than the average European.
Europe’s success is not coincidental. Studies show that countries with higher income equality and sound expert-based government regulation—areas in which European countries excel—tend to combat disease better. They are also desirable paces to live and do business: In a global poll, European countries grabbed seven of the top 10 spots on Forbes’s 2019 list of the nations with the best reputation for social, economic, and political success, whereas the United States barely cracked the top 40.
To be sure, the United States does provide most of Ukraine’s military aid, yet such assistance totals just a 10th of EU civilian aid discussed above—and the Ukrainian government is constrained to spend it on U.S.-produced conventional arms, training, and medical supplies largely available on the open market. The Trump administration’s much-heralded sale of lethal military equipment—Javelin anti-tank missiles—to Ukraine arrived only in 2018, long after Russian forces had pulled back, unlikely to return. And the United States has imposed the explicit condition that the missiles must be stored almost a thousand miles from the front and cannot be used in combat. In contrast to European aid, U.S. military assistance is more symbolic than real.
Journalists, pundits, and politicians overlook Europe’s record of success because it is, in a word, dull. Europe’s quiet and patient style of foreign policy lacks the flash and charisma of old-fashioned crisis diplomacy conducted in the shadow of coercive force. Unlike Trump’s America, Europe does not grab headlines by precipitously launching trade wars—or real ones. Unlike Putin’s Russia, it does not subvert elections and pollute the internet. Unlike Xi Jinping’s China, it does not incarcerate ethnic minorities or provoke military clashes along its borders. Old-school geopoliticians are baffled (and often bored) by decisions taken by Brussels-based institutions where it is difficult to tell who is in charge—or even, as Kissinger once quipped, whom to call.
Boring though this incremental and technocratic policymaking may be, it works. This has been shown not just by the examples above but in Europe’s recent decisions to provide 750 billion euros ($826 billion) in added financial firepower to stabilize the euro; to craft a system to screen Chinese investment in Europe; to switch to European-built 5G mobile networks; to promote peace and development in the Western Balkans; and now, without fear of a British veto, to coordinate tax policies.