The Coming Realignment: Cities, Class and Ideology After Social Conservatism

Look at third world countries, many of them elect socially conservative governments, in fact, most do.

What's that got to do with this? Their level of cultural development is unrelated to ours. The world's most highly developed countries economically are also the most secular/modern culturally, haven't you noticed?
 
In fact, no we haven't. I won't explain why, but its even better than I thought in terms of the pop culture irrelevance. I just did some numbers crunching recently, and in fact, you've "won" by buying up pop culture, but you haven't one the people at all.

You are confusing cause and effect here. Pop culture is less artificial than you think, it emerges from the people.
 
Re-read what I said about TP, Cubans, and AAs.

I did. It does not apply to AAs. Biggummint, deficit spending, etc., have never frightened them. And their Millennial generation will be more socially liberal than their parents, just like other ethnic groups' Millennials.
 
I did. It does not apply to AAs. Biggummint, deficit spending, etc., have never frightened them. And their Millennial generation will be more socially liberal than their parents, just like other ethnic groups' Millennials.

Not with their dismal employment numbers. For you know it theyre gonna riot cuz the faggots got all the jobs.
 
One thing is for sure: the end of the accursed Traditionalist gender role belief system is is at hand. Even if they don't drag the pestilence of radical feminism down with them, at least one virulent enemy of men's rights - the more subtle one - is certain to die.
 
The Tea Party is OCD about government taxing and spending

LMFAO.....sure..and the GOP is economically conservative :rolleyes:

You lot are so fucking full of shit....and dim too....

They want the MONEY and they want it spent on THEIR interest, everyone else's interest = communism!! LOL
 
More from Lind:

Saturday, May 17, 2014 09:45 AM EDT

R.I.P. social conservatism: Why itā€™s dying ā€” and the coming realignment

Don't cheer yet, liberals. A direct consequence could be the crack-up of todayā€™s Democratic coalition. Here's why

Michael Lind


In our age of political trench warfare, it is easy to assume that todayā€™s political coalitions will last forever. Democrats put their hopes in the incremental demographic growth of their present coalition of blacks, Latinos and white progressives, chiefly as a result of Latino immigration. Forward-thinking Republican strategists hope to thwart a permanent Democratic majority by enticing a sufficient number of Latinos, if not blacks, to vote for the GOP. These are reasonable strategies for both sides, for the next few electoral cycles.

But the fixed political trenches have been dug into a glacier which itself is both changing and moving. In a new article at Breakthrough Journal, ā€œThe Coming Realignment: Cities, Class, and Ideology After Social Conservatism,ā€ I speculate about how one long-term social trend in particular ā€” the decline of social conservatism ā€” is likely to transform the definition of categories that today we take for granted, like ā€œprogressive,ā€ ā€œconservativeā€ and ā€œcentrist.ā€

You wouldnā€™t know it from watching MSNBC or Fox, but the era in which controversies over social issues like ā€œGod, gays and gunsā€ defines political alignments is probably drawing to a close, thanks to the social liberalism of younger Americans such as Millennials, who were born in 1981 or later. Millennials are the least religious generation, with fewer than one in 10 saying that religion is important in their lives. They are the only generation in which a majority (70 percent) supports gay marriage. And Millennials are not only less likely than their elders to own guns but also provide majority support to gun control.

Does the rise of social liberalism mean that todayā€™s Democratic coalition will permanently dominate American politics in a decade or a generation? Will John Judis and Ruy Teixeira be vindicated by the final emergence of ā€œthe emerging Democratic majorityā€?

Itā€™s possible that a combination of Latino votes and social liberalism among younger generations will push todayā€™s Democratic coalition into power for decades or generations, but I donā€™t think so. On the contrary, I argue that the rise of social liberalism and the decline of social conservatism will destabilize existing American political divisions and shatter and recombine todayā€™s parties, in surprising ways.

If we imagine a graph with two axes, social issues (liberal and conservative) and economic issues (liberal and conservative), then it is clear that Americans have long been divided among four groups. Progressives are liberal with respect to both social issues and economic issues; conservatives, the reverse. But there are also a small number of libertarians, who unite social liberalism with pro-market, anti-statist economic conservatism; and a large number of populists, like the aging white working-class ā€œReagan Democrats,ā€ who combine social conservatism with support for liberal New Deal and Great Society programs like Social Security and Medicare.

If social liberal attitudes become nearly universal, then todayā€™s conservatism and todayā€™s populism vanish or become marginalized. A four-fold division of the American electorate would be replaced by a simpler binary opposition. In an America which, a generation or two hence, practically everyone is a social liberal, there would be two socially liberal factions that disagree chiefly about economics, even as they share current liberal positions on abortion, gay rights and censorship.

This realignment of attitudes will not happen by 2020, perhaps not even by 2030. But it has already occurred in Britain and most of Europe, where the local conservatives are social liberals, by American standards. By the mid-21st century, a similar situation is likely to obtain on this side of the Atlantic.

One of the consequences I predict is the crack-up of todayā€™s Democratic coalition ā€” paradoxically, as a direct consequence of the decline of social conservatism.

At the moment the Democrats are a tenuous coalition of economic progressives and ā€œneoliberalsā€ or moderate economic conservatives. In their policy views many of the neoliberals, including arguably Barack Obama and the Clintons, are what used to be called ā€œRockefeller Republicans.ā€ Many neoliberals favor smaller government, free trade, deregulation and lower taxes and side with the Democrats chiefly because of the religiosity and social conservatism of todayā€™s Republicans.

If the threat of religious fundamentalism and social conservatism declines, there is really no reason for the allies of neoliberals like Robert Rubin and the allies of economic progressives like Elizabeth Warren to remain in the same party. This is why, in ā€œThe Coming Realignment,ā€ I predict that the two wings of todayā€™s Democrats may evolve into the nuclei of the two national parties of tomorrow, once social conservatism goes the way of segregationism and agrarianism.

Because both economic progressives and neoliberals call themselves ā€œprogressivesā€ today, to avoid confusion I describe the likely future coalitions using portmanteau names: ā€œPopuliberalsā€ (socially liberal and economically liberal) and ā€œliberaltariansā€ (socially liberal and economically conservative). The useful term ā€œliberaltarianismā€ is already in circulation, to describe the overlapping position of the right wing of progressivism and the left wing of libertarianism.

In the essay, I argue that these future factions are likely to have their own geographic bases, with populiberalism strongest in ā€œPosturbiaā€ (suburbs and exurbs) while liberaltarianism will flourish in the urban downtowns of ā€œDensitaria.ā€ I should emphasize that by ā€œurbanā€ I do not mean ā€œnonwhite,ā€ just as by ā€œPosturbianā€ I do not mean ā€œred stateā€ versus ā€œblue stateā€ or the ā€œRetro/Metroā€ schema put forth by John Sperling in 2004. I am describing a possible future, not the present or the past. Already a majority of Latinos and African-Americans live in the suburbs, and decades from now most immigrants in immigrant-rich urban areas may no longer be from Latin America. And remember, nearly everyone in the future in this thought experiment is a social liberal, by todayā€™s standards. So I am not talking about conservative white-flight suburbs versus black inner cities. I am talking about a different and new pattern of political geography.

In post-social-conservative America, the division between Posturbia and Densitaria may correspond roughly to the debate among tomorrowā€™s New Deal-ish populiberals who favor universal social insurance and tomorrowā€™s liberaltarians who may favor means-tested, targeted welfare programs, like todayā€™s neoliberal Democrats or ā€œgentry liberalsā€ (to use Joel Kotkinā€™s phrase). In ā€œThe Coming Realignmentā€ I suggest:

In highly unequal societies ā€” like many Latin American countries, or cities like New York and San Francisco ā€” the middle of the metaphorical hourglass is squeezed between the rich and the poor. In such a social order, the argument for means-testing the welfare state, eliminating negligible benefits for the rich in order to somewhat expand benefits for the poor, may seem to be more persuasive.

The opposite logic holds in the low-density, low-rent environment of Posturbia, consisting of residential neighborhoods that are dominated by single-family housing and decentralized office parks, malls, and stores. Because the rich, in America as elsewhere, prefer to congregate in expensive, fashionable urban neighborhoods, there will be relatively few rich people in Posturbia. At the same time, the pattern of single-family housing has the effect of excluding people who are too poor to own homes rather than rent.

For these reasons, the emergent society of Posturbia is much more egalitarian than that of Densitaria, by default more than by design. While Densitarian urban areas have an hourglass social structure, the Posturbian suburbs, exurbs, and small towns tend to have a diamond-shaped class system, with few rich, few poor, and a dominant middle. In this environment, universal social insurance ā€” based on the bargain that everybody works, everybody pays, and everybody benefits ā€” can be expected to seem more practical and to win more political support than in the hierarchical Densitarian downtowns.

(For further speculation on the next era in American politics, read Breakthrough Journal.)

Whether my guesses prove to be prescient or misguided, one thing is certain: The ongoing erosion of social conservatism in the United States is bound to destabilize and transform American politics, even if present coalitions last through another few election cycles. Gridlock will not last forever. Big change is on the way.
 
kingofAssTards is busy cutting and pasting socialist bullshit....dude, we get it you are a complete fuck up!


what your dumbass needs to do is spend less time on your illness, and focus on finding a job

you are a broken, coward
 
If social conservatism becomes less resonate with the voters it is likely to help the Democrats.

Beginning with the election of 1968 lower income white social conservatives began leaving the Democratic Party for the GOP. Economic policies by Republican politicians have not helped them.

Currently most Americans are losing ground economically, while the rich are getting richer. For most Americans capitalism is not working. That is why socialism is becoming more popular.

Nevertheless, before liberal Democrats start passing around the champagne, they should try to understand why lower income white social conservatives left the Democratic Party.

From 1960 to 1970 the crime rate doubled. From 1960 to 1980 the crime rate tripled. Since 1980 the prison population has tripled. The crime rate has declined by one third.

The social reform and social welfare spending of the 1960's did not reduce the crime rate. More punishment did.

The religious right was largely motivated by a reaction against the sexual revolution. The sexual revolution was never really a political issue, because in a country like the United States there is little the government can do to influence sexual behavior. Nevertheless, during the 1950's the vast majority of children were raised to adulthood by both biological parents living together in matrimony. Now a very large percentage are not. Children raised the way the vast majority were during the 1950's tend to do better in life.
 
But how will ugly women progress in the business world without Nazi feminism????
:D

They'll thrive, because sexist Cold War-era assholes like yourself are aging, retired and/or dying.

tumblr_m5h2ntDc4N1r3zat8.gif
 
you socialist mental defects have to be careful of the derp factor as you might drown in your own fucked up bullshit

continue with your obama circle jerk .... some day you will wake up that there is no happy ending. at least you guys are stocking the cock of the person to your right
 
ah yes, the queen of Stupid has come back to bless his fellow mental defectives


If social conservatism becomes less resonate with the voters it is likely to help the Democrats.

Beginning with the election of 1968 lower income white social conservatives began leaving the Democratic Party for the GOP. Economic policies by Republican politicians have not helped them.

Currently most Americans are losing ground economically, while the rich are getting richer. For most Americans capitalism is not working. That is why socialism is becoming more popular.

Nevertheless, before liberal Democrats start passing around the champagne, they should try to understand why lower income white social conservatives left the Democratic Party.

From 1960 to 1970 the crime rate doubled. From 1960 to 1980 the crime rate tripled. Since 1980 the prison population has tripled. The crime rate has declined by one third.

The social reform and social welfare spending of the 1960's did not reduce the crime rate. More punishment did.

The religious right was largely motivated by a reaction against the sexual revolution. The sexual revolution was never really a political issue, because in a country like the United States there is little the government can do to influence sexual behavior. Nevertheless, during the 1950's the vast majority of children were raised to adulthood by both biological parents living together in matrimony. Now a very large percentage are not. Children raised the way the vast majority were during the 1950's tend to do better in life.
 
The social reform and social welfare spending of the 1960's did not reduce the crime rate. More punishment did.

Phasing out leaded gasoline might have had a lot to do with it. The crime rate has also declined in Europe, without applying our level of incarceration.
 
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