What's one book you would recommend...

[Rightguide]

Oh fuck. We thought you were dead so we sold all your shit.

Ah, so the estate sale proceeded ahead of the obituary. How efficient. I trust you drove a hard bargain on the contents of my mind; they were the only valuables in this place, and plainly beyond your use. Do keep the proceeds. It’s the closest you’ll come to profit from my existence, and I should hate to deprive you of your imaginary success.

 

[eric_erosfan]

Ah, so the estate sale proceeded ahead of the obituary. How efficient. I trust you drove a hard bargain on the contents of my mind; they were the only valuables in this place, and plainly beyond your use. Do keep the proceeds. It’s the closest you’ll come to profit from my existence, and I should hate to deprive you of your imaginary success.

Lol. Nobody wanted your used butt plug so you still have that.

 

[Rightguide]

Lol. Nobody wanted your used butt plug so you still have that.

The above is a low IQ response from the gay bleachers of Lit. Real men like myself have no use or need of your toys.

 

[eric_erosfan]

The above is a low IQ response from the gay bleachers of Lit. Real men like myself have no use or need of your toys.

I just came in for a quick lunch. So I have to keep my responses short and sweet.

 

[Rightguide]

I just came in for a quick lunch. So I have to keep my responses short and sweet.

A lack of time explains brevity; it doesn’t explain your incoherence.

 

[Cat]

The above is a low IQ response from the gay bleachers of Lit. Real men like myself have no use or need of your toys.

How can you say such embarrassing words?!

 

[BoredDirtyCommie]

How can you say such embarrassing words?!

Dudes being homophobic on a porn site are weird

 

[GuiltyCowboy]

You should have read the book before spouting off. American Caesar, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964, does more than recount the life of Douglas MacArthur; it mythologizes him. William Manchester writes with such narrative force and admiration that MacArthur emerges not merely as a flawed commander, but as a near-messianic figure, embattled, misunderstood, and ultimately vindicated by history rather than constrained by institutions.

That framing can subtly condition readers to view strong, willful leadership, especially leadership that resists civilian oversight, as admirable rather than dangerous. MacArthur’s repeated clashes with presidents, most notably Harry S. Truman, are presented less as cautionary tales about civilian control of the military and more as tragic episodes of a great man being held back by lesser political minds.

The downstream effect is cultural, not immediate: when a widely read work elevates a figure who skirts constitutional boundaries while portraying him as heroic, it helps normalize the idea that exceptional individuals should override procedural limits in moments of crisis. Over time, that aesthetic, of the lone, decisive figure standing above the system, can feed into what people now call an “authoritarian moment,” where institutional restraint is seen as weakness and personal authority as strength.

In short, the book doesn’t advocate authoritarianism outright. But by romanticizing a figure who often operated at its edge, it contributes to a broader narrative: that greatness and constraint are incompatible, and that, in times of tension, the former should win.

One of the most consequential episodes in American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964 is Douglas MacArthur’s tenure as Supreme Commander during the occupation of Japan. William Manchester portrays this period as a triumph of enlightened, almost paternal authority, MacArthur ruling with sweeping, quasi-imperial discretion while reshaping an entire հասարակiety’s political and social structure.

What’s often underemphasized, however, is that this was governance with minimal democratic constraint: directives flowed from a single office, dissent was tightly managed, and legitimacy rested heavily on MacArthur’s personal authority. The fact that many Japanese accepted, or at least adapted to, this arrangement can be read in two ways. On one hand, it reflects the preexisting conditioning of a society that had just emerged from an imperial system centered on obedience and hierarchy. On the other, it risks reinforcing the idea that such top-down control can be not only effective, but broadly acceptable if exercised by a “benevolent” figure.

In Manchester’s telling, the occupation becomes less a case study in the temporary necessity of centralized authority under extraordinary circumstances and more an example of how a singular, decisive leader can successfully reorder a society. That distinction matters. When readers absorb this episode through a lens of admiration, it can subtly validate the notion that expansive, personalized power, unchecked by normal institutional limits, is justified if it produces stability or reform.

So the Japanese example doesn’t just illustrate MacArthur’s authority; it strengthens the book’s underlying theme: that in moments of upheaval, concentrated power in the hands of the “right” individual can be both legitimate and desirable. That’s precisely the kind of narrative that can echo forward into modern debates about authority, leadership, and the role of constraints.

RG

Interesting. Thanks for writing that out.

I think one can put these types of leader into two broad categories: those who have emerged in times of uncertainty to provide stability, on the one hand, and those, on the other, who create instability by overreaching.

I'd put people like Napoleon and Lee Kuan Yew, and possibly even Putin, in the first category. Radically different people in radically different situations obviously. And all very arguable of course. (The 'terror' of the French revolution was responsible for something like 16,000 lives; Napoleon was responsible for 1.5 million...).

Most of the authoritarians today, I'd put in the second. Orban, Bolsanaro and Trump, for example. And of course everyone's favorite fascists from 1930s. They tend to exploit some kind of weakness rather than emerge from uncertainty. And they often manufacture crisis in order to then take advantage of the uncertainty that follows.

At the end of your post, you use the word 'legitimate'. I think that becomes a very thorny issue with these types of leader.

 

[Rightguide]

How can you say such embarrassing words?!

Because it's true, I haven't been feminized, or broken to the butt plug as was Eric who insists on projecting his moral corruption onto normal men he disagrees with.

 

[Cat]

Because it's true, I haven't been feminized, or broken to the butt plug as was Eric who insists on projecting his moral corruption onto normal men he disagrees with.

You could also just say: Not my kink.

But, you chose to go full kink shaming. Good for you.

(And again, using too many words!)

 

[DeluxAuto]

You should have read the book before spouting off. American Caesar, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964, does more than recount the life of Douglas MacArthur; it mythologizes him. William Manchester writes with such narrative force and admiration that MacArthur emerges not merely as a flawed commander, but as a near-messianic figure, embattled, misunderstood, and ultimately vindicated by history rather than constrained by institutions.

That framing can subtly condition readers to view strong, willful leadership, especially leadership that resists civilian oversight, as admirable rather than dangerous. MacArthur’s repeated clashes with presidents, most notably Harry S. Truman, are presented less as cautionary tales about civilian control of the military and more as tragic episodes of a great man being held back by lesser political minds.

The downstream effect is cultural, not immediate: when a widely read work elevates a figure who skirts constitutional boundaries while portraying him as heroic, it helps normalize the idea that exceptional individuals should override procedural limits in moments of crisis. Over time, that aesthetic, of the lone, decisive figure standing above the system, can feed into what people now call an “authoritarian moment,” where institutional restraint is seen as weakness and personal authority as strength.

In short, the book doesn’t advocate authoritarianism outright. But by romanticizing a figure who often operated at its edge, it contributes to a broader narrative: that greatness and constraint are incompatible, and that, in times of tension, the former should win.

One of the most consequential episodes in American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964 is Douglas MacArthur’s tenure as Supreme Commander during the occupation of Japan. William Manchester portrays this period as a triumph of enlightened, almost paternal authority, MacArthur ruling with sweeping, quasi-imperial discretion while reshaping an entire հասարակiety’s political and social structure.

What’s often underemphasized, however, is that this was governance with minimal democratic constraint: directives flowed from a single office, dissent was tightly managed, and legitimacy rested heavily on MacArthur’s personal authority. The fact that many Japanese accepted, or at least adapted to, this arrangement can be read in two ways. On one hand, it reflects the preexisting conditioning of a society that had just emerged from an imperial system centered on obedience and hierarchy. On the other, it risks reinforcing the idea that such top-down control can be not only effective, but broadly acceptable if exercised by a “benevolent” figure.

In Manchester’s telling, the occupation becomes less a case study in the temporary necessity of centralized authority under extraordinary circumstances and more an example of how a singular, decisive leader can successfully reorder a society. That distinction matters. When readers absorb this episode through a lens of admiration, it can subtly validate the notion that expansive, personalized power, unchecked by normal institutional limits, is justified if it produces stability or reform.

So the Japanese example doesn’t just illustrate MacArthur’s authority; it strengthens the book’s underlying theme: that in moments of upheaval, concentrated power in the hands of the “right” individual can be both legitimate and desirable. That’s precisely the kind of narrative that can echo forward into modern debates about authority, leadership, and the role of constraints.

RG

You think of the senile pedo as an equal to MacArthur which renders your opinion of MacArthur as total garbage.

 

[GuiltyCowboy]

I haven't been feminized

Heaven forbid you end up like Cary Grant. Famously unappealing to women.

 

[eric_erosfan]

Because it's true, I haven't been feminized, or broken to the butt plug as was Eric who insists on projecting his moral corruption onto normal men he disagrees with.

Lol. "normal men". It wasn't my butt plug. Glamorilla will say I'm missing out, but I have never tried putting anything in my ass. I assumed it was yours but maybe you have a PB buddy.

 

[Rightguide]

Most of the authoritarians today, I'd put in the second. Orban, Bolsanaro and Trump, for example. And of course everyone's favorite fascists from 1930s. They tend to exploit some kind of weakness rather than emerge from uncertainty. And they often manufacture crisis in order to then take advantage of the uncertainty that follows.

At the end of your post, you use the word 'legitimate'. I think that becomes a very thorny issue with these types of leader.

A fair point is being referred to here, but it’s bundled with so much conceptual sprawl that it starts to lose analytical precision.

First, lumping figures like Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, and 1930s fascist regimes into a single operational category (“authoritarians”) risks flattening very different political systems, legal constraints, and institutional contexts into a moral archetype. That may be rhetorically satisfying, but it weakens explanatory power.

Second, the claim that such leaders primarily “exploit weakness” or “manufacture crisis” is partially descriptive but incomplete. Political actors across the spectrum respond to crises they do not fully control, and the line between opportunism and structural constraint is often far blurrier than the framing suggests. If every contested political outcome is treated as “manufactured,” the concept becomes difficult to falsify.

This is where historical comparison becomes useful. Take Abraham Lincoln, hardly a peripheral figure in any discussion of executive power. During the Civil War, he suspended habeas corpus, arrested politicians, expanded federal authority, and took unilateral action on matters of life, liberty, and war-making that would be considered extraordinary by peacetime standards. Yet he is not typically categorized alongside 20th-century authoritarian regimes, because the actions are interpreted through the lens of constitutional crisis, civil war, and eventual restoration of order under democratic continuity.

That comparison doesn’t absolve or indict modern figures by association; it highlights the problem of using “authoritarian” as a static label rather than a situational description. Emergency expansion of executive power, political norm-breaking, and institutional tension are not rare deviations in history, they are recurring features of states under stress.

Finally, on “legitimacy,” this is where the real complexity sits. Legitimacy in modern systems is rarely binary. It is layered: electoral, legal, procedural, and perceived. Leaders can be simultaneously legitimate in one sense and deeply contested in another. Treating legitimacy as something that simply evaporates once a leader is labeled “authoritarian” skips over the institutional mechanisms that either constrain or enable their behavior.

In short: the concern about concentrated power is valid, but it needs tighter definitions and less conceptual bundling if it’s going to function as analysis rather than taxonomy-by-emotion.

I might add as well that people are quick to label Trump a “king” or an “authoritarian,” but those terms are being used more as rhetorical shorthand than as careful legal descriptions. Whatever one thinks of his style or politics, the more grounded question is whether his actions have actually crossed constitutional lines, meaning clear violations of law, defiance of court orders, or exercises of power outside the scope of Article II authority.

On that narrower, legally meaningful standard, the case is far less clear than the labels suggest. Assertions of overreach and controversy are not the same thing as demonstrated illegality or constitutional breach, and collapsing that distinction tends to substitute moral characterization for legal analysis.

RG

 

[Cat]

Lol. "normal men". It wasn't my butt plug. Glamorilla will say I'm missing out, but I have never tried putting anything in my ass. I assumed it was yours but maybe you have a PB buddy.

Awww.. you found my butt plug?!

.... Seriously, it is just a sex toy.

And way less wordy and whiny than some "real men" here.

 

[SoCalAshley]

I read The Coming Wave: AI, Power, and Our Future by Mustafa Suleyman a couple of years ago and then reread it recently. I was blown away how close he was to predicting the real risk of powerful AI systems outpacing our ability to control them. For me, the book was an eye-opening read, and I would recommend it to anyone who uses AI casually but hasn’t thought through the broader consequences.

 

[Holy_Seduction]

how we arrived at this authoritarian moment

This one. For the reason that you state.

 

[DeluxAuto]

First, lumping figures like Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, and 1930s fascist regimes into a single operational category (“authoritarians”) risks flattening very different political systems, legal constraints, and institutional contexts into a moral archetype. That may be rhetorically satisfying, but it weakens explanatory power.

You do this when you call anyone left of trump a communist, Marxist, antifa, liberal, socialist.

You're an ignorant hypocrite.

 

[GuiltyCowboy]

risks flattening very different political systems, legal constraints, and institutional contexts into a moral archetype. That may be rhetorically satisfying, but it weakens explanatory power.

Not really. The very definition of an authoritarian is that they use their power - their authority - to impose policies that people don't actually want. Which is why they're laser-focused on attacking or capturing the media, universities, the judiciary, the intelligentsia, and NGOs - basically, anyone who can call out their abuse of power and potentially constrain it.

Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, and the 1930s fascist regimes have all engaged in that textbook authoritarian behavior.

(And all depended on the support of the conservative elite. No authoritarian has ever come to power in a democracy without the support of the conservatives. That's what really ties authoritarians together.)

And it's by engaging in that very behavior - in dismantling or at least weakening the institutions of democracy - that the authoritarians overreach and create instability.

None of Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump came to power during a crisis or a period of extraordinary uncertainty. (But they’ve given us attempted coups, brain drains, militia on the streets, wars, clientelism and endemic corruption…)

Neither did the fascists in the 20th century - not like Napoleon yoking together the mess that was post-revolutionary France and defeating the monarchies that encircled it.

 

[Chernosoth]

None of Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump came to power during a crisis or a period of extraordinary uncertainty.

That shows how sheltered you have been. We were and still are in a crisis, but it hasn't reached you yet. In 2016, most of the nation was struggling to survive. 35 years of exporting our economy to Asia and Mexico hollowed out our economy. For a large percentage of the population, voting for Trump was their last attempt at democracy before proceeding to violent revolt. I say still are because a bubble is building again, and this one looks likely to be much more devastating than the 2008 real estate bubble. Now it's an everything bubble. After it pops, the president, probably Vance then, could have the political capital and leverage to make some sort of more permanent solution to stop bubbles forming. Stopping it now requires authoritarian power that Trump doesn't have. With everything else he's trying to do with little time left, he might not even know a bubble is growing. Vance may have a sword hanging over his head at inauguration.

 

[BoredDirtyCommie]

You could also just say: Not my kink.

But, you chose to go full kink shaming. Good for you.

(And again, using too many words!)

Once again, I'm finding it very funny that there's folks like RG in here talking about moral corruption on a site where pornography is the main feature.

I think degradation is his kink. That's the only reason why he posts here. Talking about "making America great again" is guaranteed to get lots of insults thrown at you.

 

[GuiltyCowboy]

That shows how sheltered you have been. We were and still are in a crisis, but it hasn't reached you yet. In 2016, most of the nation was struggling to survive. 35 years of exporting our economy to Asia and Mexico hollowed out our economy. For a large percentage of the population, voting for Trump was their last attempt at democracy before proceeding to violent revolt. I say still are because a bubble is building again, and this one looks likely to be much more devastating than the 2008 real estate bubble. Now it's an everything bubble. After it pops, the president, probably Vance then, could have the political capital and leverage to make some sort of more permanent solution to stop bubbles forming. Stopping it now requires authoritarian power that Trump doesn't have. With everything else he's trying to do with little time left, he might not even know a bubble is growing. Vance may have a sword hanging over his head at inauguration.

You're describing neo-liberalism, or what some people call late-stage capitalism - the low wages, low taxes, high shareholder value, high inequality system we've been living under since the Reagan/Thatcher years.

It causes all sorts of problems for sure but I think it's debatable that it's an existential crisis.

I'm astonished you cannot see that Trump and the other authoritarians are an extension of this system - an intense deepening of it, in fact - but of course you've already shown you're unwilling to read any research that lays out Trump's corruption.

 

[GuiltyCowboy]

That shows how sheltered you have been. We were and still are in a crisis, but it hasn't reached you yet. In 2016, most of the nation was struggling to survive. 35 years of exporting our economy to Asia and Mexico hollowed out our economy. For a large percentage of the population, voting for Trump was their last attempt at democracy before proceeding to violent revolt. I say still are because a bubble is building again, and this one looks likely to be much more devastating than the 2008 real estate bubble. Now it's an everything bubble. After it pops, the president, probably Vance then, could have the political capital and leverage to make some sort of more permanent solution to stop bubbles forming. Stopping it now requires authoritarian power that Trump doesn't have. With everything else he's trying to do with little time left, he might not even know a bubble is growing. Vance may have a sword hanging over his head at inauguration.

You might want to read this little summary of how Trump is doing what authoritarians do: massively expand security apparatus while hollowing out everything else, especially environmental protections, and using the state to enrich themselves.

And you’ll like this bit: it’s not in the corporate media. The Guardian is owned by a foundation. It's by Rebecca Solnit, one of the better writers about America at the moment.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/apr/12/united-states-trump-destruction

 

[Chernosoth]

You might want to read this little summary of how Trump is doing what authoritarians do: massively expand security apparatus while hollowing out everything else, especially environmental protections, and using the state to enrich themselves.

And you’ll like this bit: it’s not in the corporate media. The Guardian is owned by a foundation. It's by Rebecca Solnit, one of the better writers about America at the moment.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/apr/12/united-states-trump-destruction

The Guardian was a respectable outlet of journalism, once upon a time. It published Glenn Greenwald's interview of Edward Snowden. The Obama admin leaned on the British government to break the Guardian's will. Now it's a very ordinary propaganda outlet of the British government. It provides a heavily slanted view of Trump doing exactly what he was hired to do: cut government waste down as much as possible, closer to what we can afford with our neoliberalized economy. Economic recovery will take a long time after decades of neoliberalism. We don't have a long time before the world drops the dollar as reserve currency, and that's the end of the US running a budget deficit.

It mentions Trump moving the Bureau of Land Management. That's a great idea that was immediately obvious to me years ago. It should be closer to the land it manages. Bureaucrats who quit because they don't want to leave DC are welcome to get the fuck out. Do the work where work is needed or good fucking bye.

 

[Chernosoth]

For a book recommendation, any of Ayn Rand's books, because I read one, the shorter novel with the architect. John Norman may have seen her success with rape fantasies and decided to get a piece of that action. If you haven't already read one, pick the shorter book, or just read any article about her. That may be enough to explain the beginning of neoliberalism.